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DIVISIBLE DIVORCE
L. A.

HASLup

"Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts,
Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress
may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records
and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof."'
"And the said records and judicial proceedings .. .shall have such faith
and credit given to them in every court within the United States as they
have by the law or usage in the courts of the State from which they are
taken."2
"... nor shall any State deprive any person of ... property without due

process of law."s

Goodrich's statement, "Conflict of laws is active, growing, controversial",4 is peculiarly applicable as to what, if any, extra-territorial
effect will be given a so-called migratory divorce decree.
Our purpose is not to discuss the divorce problem as such and in
its entirety, but rather to consider a very limited phase of it, namely,
the extra-territorial recognition and effectiveness of foreign decrees,
along with some of the constitutional questions implicit in foreign
ex parte divorce proceedings as distinct from the moral, religious
or sociological questions inherent in divorce itself. It is the task
of lawyers and the courts to interpret the basic state and federal
law for clients and litigants, and to indulge in judicial legislation to
no greater an extent than ambiguities in legislative draftsmanship
necessitate.
If divorce could be made "decent" and questions of guilt or inno'U. S.

CONST.

2REV. STAT.

Art. IV, §1.

§905 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §687 (1946).

Amend. XIV, §1.
Goodrich, Five Years of Conflicts of Laws, 32

SU. S. CONST.
4

VA.

L.

REv.

295 (1946).

(145)
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cence eliminated from divorce proceedings, 5 our present problen
would be rendered less acute. A cursory reading of the full faith an(
credit clause and its implementation statute logically gives the im
pression that a divorce rendered by judicial act in one state o
territory of the United States dissolves a given marriage throughou
sister states. Yet few issues are so provocative of indignant commen
as the action of a foreign jurisdiction in divorcing a citizen regardec
up to the time of divorce, as a member of the home communith
The lawyer who expects a measure of logical symmetry in this fiei
of law is doomed to disappointment; the field has become one i
which "confusion now hath made his masterpiece."6
Two

CASES OF JURISDICTION

Domicil has long been the basis of divorce jurisdiction both i
this country and in England. English law has sought to avoid tb
pitfalls of lack of certainty and predictability in this field by reco
nizing, under the unitary domicil concept, only one divorc
jurisdiction.7 Other units within the British system are allowing t
acquisition of separate domicil by the wife or husband, and provid
for the running of process of one geographical subdivision throughot
the others. The continental European test of jurisdiction, on tl
other hand, is often nationality.
In the much discussed and criticized case of Pemberton v. Hughes
in which the validity of a Florida divorce was questioned, the decr
was held valid by the English court despite actual notice of bi
nine days in lieu of the ten required by Florida statute. Havir
once found proper Florida jurisdiction in the private internation
or conflict of laws sense, and compliance with the English view i
"substantial justice," a term not well defined but covering tho!
For discussions of the sociological problems involved and the unsatisfacto
state of our divorce laws, see Alexander, The Follies of Divorce, 36 A.B.A.J. I(
(1950); Alexander, Family Life Conference, 32 J. AM. Jui. Soc'y 38, 40 (1948
"Every honest lawyer is ashamed of the hypocrisy and lies in which he usual
must handle a divorce case; every conscientious judge is bitter about his impoten
under existing limitations and restrictions"; Walker, Our Present Divorce Mudd
35 A.B.A.J. 457 (1949); Wels, New York: The Poor Man's Reno, 35 Co-NEL L.
303 (1950); and the symposia in 10 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. No. 5 (1944) ai
2 id. No. 3 (1935).
6
Jackson, J., dissenting in Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 676 (1949).
7GOODICH, CONFLICT OF LAws §127 (3d ed. 1949); Note, 31 IowA L. R1s
237 (1946).
81 Ch. 781 (1899).
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cases in which a defect in the foreign proceedings has prevented
a party from presenting his case, the English court refused to review
the Florida decision; the original error should have been corrected
by appeal. The question before the English court was not whether
the Florida court had properly followed its own rules of procedure,
but whether it was competent to summon the defendant before it
and subject him to judgment. The English court did not consider
itself entitled to investigate the propriety of the foreign proceedings, provided its own basic concept of substantial justice was
satisfied; the mere fact that the notice missed by a day the period
required by the procedural code of the forum did not necessarily
spell invalidity.
This case, despite criticisms leveled at it,9 represents an attempt
on the part of the English judiciary to reach a fair decision, while
avoiding the pitfalls of the comity doctrine in the form of reciprocity and retaliation. This latter doctrine all too frequently loses sight
of the fact that a litigant is before the court seeking practical justice
9
See STUMBERO, CozNmcT OF LAWS 109 (1937): "The result of the decision,
in effect, is that the judgment was valid everywhere except in Florida where it
was rendered"; Harper, CollateralAttack on ForeignJudgments, 41 COL. L. REv.
221, 222 (1941). Goodrich makes the distinction that when a judgment is granted
without complying with a procedural rule, and is accordingly invalid in the state
of rendition rather than merely reversible on appeal, it is not entitled to recognition elsewhere. GooDRIcH, CoNIcT OF LAws §209 (3d ed. 1949). REsTATEmENT, Co.acr OF LAws §432 (1934) uses the facts of the Pemberton case to
illustrate a situation in which a foreign decree is not recognized.
Although English law has not abandoned domicil as a basis for divorce
jurisdiction, recent English statutes permit an English wife to sue for divorce and
restoration of conjugal rights in a limited number of situations even though her
husband is domiciled outside England. The Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, 1 EDw.
VIII & 1 Go. VI, c. 57, confers jurisdiction on the English courts in cases of
deportation or desertion in which the husband immediately before his desertion
or deportation has been domiciled in England, even though he is domiciled abroad
at time of suit. See CHESiRmE, PivATE INTNATIONAL LAw 475 (3d ed. 1947);
GOODRICH, CoNHicr OF LAws §132 n.38 (3d ed. 1949); Cheshire, The International Validity of Divorce Decrees, 61 L.Q. REv. 352, 358 (1945). Cf. also
Thompson v. Whitman, 18 Wall. 457 (U.S. 1873); REsTATEmENT, CoNFacr OF
LAWS §429, comment g (1934).
Pemberton v. Hughes was followed in C. v. C., 39 Ont. L.R. 571 (1917), in
which failure to meet Illinois residence requirements before filing petition was
held not fatal to recognition of the Illinois decree. The 'Chicago court had jurisdiction to grant the divorce, since the defendant was domiciled in its jurisdiction;
and the court was not concerned with possible mistake, there being no real
question of fraud. Cf. READ, REcoGNmroN AND ENroacan-ram
OF FoRmGN DEcrEFs 93 et seq. (1938).
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and is not interested in the mutual respect of rival forums.
In viewing Pemberton v. Hughes from a jurisdictional viewpoir
the Florida case Ogden v. Ogden10 is significant. Ogden, an America
citizen living abroad, had left his wife in England at the outbree
of the recent war. She brought suit in England for restoration i
conjugal rights, whereupon he filed an affidavit of defense allegir
lack of jurisdiction in the English court on the ground that he w;
not domiciled in England. He failed to deposit the requisite securi
and costs, however. The court dismissed the jurisdictional issu
held his appearance a general one, and entered the decree in fav
of Mrs. Ogden. Ogden subsequently filed suit for divorce in Florid
On appeal the Supreme Court of Florida, speaking through Terre'
J., denied the effect of res judicata to the English decree and emph,
sized the fact that Ogden's domicil as determined by Florida la
was in New York, and later in Florida, thus giving Florida jurisdictic
to enter a divorce decree.
It is apparent that the Florida Court was influenced by its coi
cept of due process of law, comparable in many respects to ti
English concept of substantial justice. Because the English cou
had refused to consider the Ogden affidavit denying English domici
and had thereby denied Ogden a reasonable opportunity to be hear
the Florida court held that the English court had no jurisdictio
The opinion in the Ogden case does not indicate whether the Cou
had before it Owenbey v. Morgan;" neither does it state whethi
the British Matrimonial Causes Act, 1937, purporting to confer juri
diction on the English divorce court to decree the restoration i
conjugal rights, may not have authorized and even commanded tU
British court to assume jurisdiction over Ogden.' 2 In effect the Cou
refused to recognize the English decree because the proceedinj
leading to it did not meet the Florida concept of due process: "T
English Court did not acquire jurisdiction of his person and statt
that his residence in England was not essential."13 Although J
Pemberton v. Hughes the English Court looked primarily to tl
jurisdiction of the Florida court in the conflict of laws sense, it did i
quire into jurisdiction from the conflict of laws, or international, vieN
point and from the standpoint of what might be called due process.
10159 Fla. 604, 33 So.2d 870 (1947).
11256 U.S. 94 (1921).
12

CIIESHP,
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAw 475 (3d ed. 1947).
13Ogden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 613, 33 So.2d 870, 876 (1947).
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The process of evolution through which divorce jurisdiction was
withdrawn from the ecclesiastical courts, and the brief interlude
of legislative divorce, with its final entrustment to the courts, con-

stitute historic matter requiring no elaboration here.
When enforcement of a judgment or decree secured in a foreign
tribunal is sought in another state, its validity depends upon the
jurisdiction of the court that rendered it. Whenever what purports
to be a foreign decree is presented for recognition and enforcement
the question of jurisdiction is always the primary one. 14 Logically it

may be said that a state cannot create interests when it has no jurisdiction; if domicil is the essential jurisdictional fact on which divorce
jurisdiction must be predicated, and one of the states purports to
grant a divorce, the decree is not only subject to collateral attack
but also void in the state in which it was rendered.
American authorities generally, a decade ago, recognized that
either spouse could leave the matrimonial domicil, acquire a domicil in another state, and there obtain a valid decree against the
stay-at-home spouse, even if the latter had acquired a domicil
in still a third state. To accomplish this, mere service of process
by publication was sufficient. The underlying theory was that
the spouse seeking the divorce brought the matrimonial res within
the jurisdiction of the court by establishing a domicil in the state
of the forum. A simile is found in the current flowing through an
electric cord: when the party attached to one end of the cord draws
his portion into another state and it is there cut, the current is broken
effectively, whether the person attached to the other end in another
state likes it or not.' 5
In a number of situations, the Supreme Court has enforced the
full faith and credit clause in extra-territorial divorce recognition
without hesitation, as, for example, when both spouses are domiciled
in the divorcing forum, or when both are present in the forum and
it is the domicil of one.' 6 The difficulty arises in those instances in
14

BE.STATEMENT, JUDGmrs §5 (1942); EAD, RE ocmO
N AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOR IG JUDGMmNs 125 (1938).
15 McDermott, Extra-territorialEffect of Divorce Decrees, 15 F"A L.J. 53

(1941).
1

'REsTATEmENT,CoNF LcT OF LAws §110 (1934); COODmcu, CoNmuar OF

LAws §130 (3d ed. 1949).

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss2/1

6

Divisible Divorce
LAW REVIEW
OF FLORIDA
UNIVERSITY Halsup:
which one spouse brings suit in a state allegedly his domicil against
a defendant domiciled elsewhere and service is constructive only,
even though this service meets the requirements of due process
under the law of the divorcing forum. Limits to enforcement were
set decades ago in Thompson v. Whitman,17 in which it was held
that, when the jurisdiction of a court in another state is not impeached,
either as to the subject-matter or the person, its record judgment
is entitled to full faith and credit. The Constitution was said not
to confer jurisdiction but merely to regulate the effect of acknowledged jurisdiction. Since the adoption of the Constitution, domicil
has been recognized as the basis of jurisdiction for divorce. 18
Unlike the English court, we early departed from the theory that
a wife's domicil automatically and necessarily follows that of her
husband. As early as 1869 the Supreme Court upheld the validity
elsewhere of a decree obtained by a wife against her husband,
who was personally served in the divorcing state but did not reside
there. 19 In Bell v. Bell,20 on the other hand, full faith and credit was
not accorded a divorce granted on mere constructive service by a
forum not the domicil of either of the parties, while in Atherton v.
Atherton,21 also decided in 1901, constructive service was held sufficient to maintain elsewhere the integrity of a decree rendered at
the domicil of one of the parties to the marriage. Andrews v.
Andrews,22 decided two years later, went beyond the Bell case
by holding in effect that Massachusetts was not bound to recognize
a South Dakota divorce obtained by a Massachusetts husband when
neither party was domiciled in South Dakota, even though the wife
had appeared personally and had consented to the granting of
the decree.
The change in the status of married women has been carried to
the extent that few if any of their common law disabilities remain in
this field; in determining her domicil the tests employed are those
used to determine the domicil of any other person that may act
23
for himself.
Wall. 457 (U.S. 1873).
' 8See Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
19Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. 108 (U.S. 1869).
1718

20181

U.S. 175 (1901).

21181 U.S. 155 (1901).
22188 U.S. 14 (1903).

This has recently been characterized as superseded.
U.S.
348, 853 (1948).
v.
Sherrer,
834
Sherrer
23
RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws §28 (Supp. 1938).
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In considering the effectiveness of a decree of divorce when enforcement is sought elsewhere, the great landmark is Haddock v.
Haddock.24 The parties were residents of New York and were married there; but shortly after their marriage Haddock established
a new home in Connecticut, leaving his bride in New York. After
thirteen years of residence in Connecticut, he obtained a divorce
on constructive service and remarried. In a later suit for support
brought on personal service in New York by the first Mrs. Haddock,
the New York court refused recognition to the Connecticut decree
because she had not been personally served in that state. On review,
the Supreme Court of the United States held that New York was
under no constitutional duty to recognize the Connecticut decree
in dealing with Mr. Haddock as the defendant in the New York
suit. In broader terms, a state is not required to recognize a divorce
decree obtained outside the matrimonial domicil on service by
publication, at least if the new domicil was acquired without
justification.
This famous old veteran has furnished ground for controversy
right up to the present time; and for a period of thirty-six years
the theory persisted that the courts of the defendant's domicil are
under no compulsion to give effect to such a foreign ex parte decree.
Haddock has been interpreted as a decision that " . . . merely al-

lowed New York to exclude evidence of a Connecticut divorce of
a man from his %difem determining whether New York could sanction her desire for a separation from bed and board and for alimony
. ..

"25 and it was eventually classified by the Supreme Court "...

with that group of cases which hold that when the courts of one
state do not have jurisdiction either of te subject matter or of the
person of the defendant, the courts of another state are not required
The English courts recognize a foreign decree (1) if the court of rendition is

competent according to its own lex fori, and (2) if (a) the husband was domiciled in the English sense in'that country at commencement of the suit for divorce
or (b) the decree would be recognized by the court of the husband's domicilei
STUDY 463 (1945).
cf. RARLr, THE CoNFuICr oF LAws, A COMPARAT
A recent commentary on the problems of migratory divorce indicates that the
apparent difficulties arise from three distinctly American legal propositions:
(1) a state which is the domicil of one of the married parties can grant a
divorce; (2) the divorcing state applies its own substantive law of divorce; and

(3) a wife can secure a domicil different from that of her husband. Paulsen,
Migratory Divorce: Chaps. III and IV, 24 IND. L. REv. 25 (1948).
24201
U.S. 562 (1906).
2
GPowell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HAnv. L. REv. 930, 953, (1945).
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by virtue of the full faith and credit clause to enforce the judgment." 26
Haddock nevertheless led to the adoption of the fault doctrine as
a jurisdictional fact in divorce cases, and is condemned at times as
a creator of uncertainty in the field of extra-territorial divorce. Perhaps it did not accord with the state practices then current; and it
27
generally was not followed by the state courts.
Aside from the reaction of the judiciary, the literature resulting
from Haddock has been voluminous, and many of the criticisms
are effective. 28 Beale characterized the case as contrary to authority
and good morals. 29 Twenty years elapsed before he would grudgingly
accept the Haddock doctrine; and even then his acceptance was
based on the possibility that the Connecticut court had not acquired
jurisdiction over Mrs. Haddock.3 0 Through Beale's influence the
fault doctrine of Haddock found its way into the Restatement.3 ' Professor Bingham's analysis, 32 however, is more nearly consistent with
the reality of such disputes. To him a divorce decree need not be
all good or all bad. Rather, it is a conglomerate of incidents that
can be separated; and therefore full faith and credit can be accorded
that part of the divorce decree which terminates the marital status
without affecting those other interests of the ex-wife that 6an be
classified as property rights. This differentiation was largely overlooked by many of the commentators, but it was eventually granted
the approval of the Supreme Court.
THE WILLIAMS

CASES AND

ESENWEIN

In 1940 a romantic middle-aged couple left their respective homes
in North Carolina and ultimately arrived in Nevada. 33 There, after
26

27

Douglas, J., in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
See Goodrich, Five Years of Conflicts of Laws, 32 VA. L. R1Ev. 295 (1946).

280f

the numerous articles, the following are particularly noteworthy: Bing-

ham, Song of Sixpence, 29 ConN. L.Q. 1 (1943); Lorenzen, Haddock v. Haddock,

52 YALE L.J. 341 (1943). Others are cited in Goodrich, Five Years of Conflicts
of Laws,
32 VA. L. REv. 295, 299 n.4 (1946).
29
Beale, Constitutional Protection of Decrees for Divorce, 19 HiAv. L. REv.
58630(1906).
Beale, Haddock Revisited, 39 HARv. L. REv. 417 (1926). Cf. Jackson, J.,
dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 316 n.1 (1942): "It was
twenty years before Professor Beale could justify a decision to his satisfaction.
• . . Others seem to lack his capacity of quick adjustment."
31

§113 (1934).
Bingham, In the Matter of Haddock v. Haddock, 21 CoRN. L.Q. 393 (1936).

RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAWS
32
33

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287 (1942).
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the statutory period of residence of six weeks, they were divorced
from their former spouses after serving them constructively only, and
were married to each other. Almost immediately they returned to
North Carolina, where they were promptly indicted for bigamous
cohabitation and convicted on the theory of Haddock v. Haddock,
namely, that constructive or substituted service by a party at fault
is insufficient unless the state of divorce is that of the marital domicil. The Supreme Court reversed, inasmuch as North Carolina had
attacked the merits of the Nevada decree rather than the jurisdiction.
Williams I is another of those cases that are much discussed but
apparently little understood.3 4 Like prior similar cases, it raises
problems not only as to the adequacy of the full faith and credit
clause as the unifying force in our federal jurisprudence but also
as to due process. Furthermore, although the Supreme Court expressly commanded that full faith and credit be accorded the Nevada
decree, it left unsettled the problem of whether all of the Nevada
decree need be given extra-territorial effect. It ruled on marital
status only; property rights in another state were not involved. The
decision can be reconciled with the interpretation of the full faith
and credit clause in other fields of law. Limited, as it should be, to
the issues before the Court, Williams I merely upheld the Nevada
divorce as a basis for remarriage as against the charge of bigamous
cohabitation. No question of continuing obligation to support the
first Mrs. Williams was raised. The Court said, nevertheless, that
it was overruling Haddock v. Haddock; and the decision at least
had the merit of discarding the fault doctrine.
North Carolina was not discouraied, however. The second conviction of Mr. Williams and his new bride, predicated this time
on a jurisdictional attack, was afilrmed.3 5 The evidence that the
two had stayed in a motor-court in Nevada and had departed immediately upon decree was considered ample to sustain the North
Carolina finding that the couple. had gone to Nevada merely to get
a divorce, and not to establish a home. The opinion, moreover, re34
For a similar view see Goodrich, Five Years of Conflicts of Laws, 82 VA.
L. REV. 295, 299 (1946).
35
Williams v. North Carolina, 825 U.S. 226 (1945). Frankfurter, J., succinctly
stated the facts in the Williams case at p. 236: ".... lopg-time residents of North
Carolina, came to Nevada, where they stayed in an auto-court for transients, filed
suits for divorce as soon as the Nevada law permitted, married one another as
soon as the divorces were obtained, and promptly returned to North Carolina to

live."

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss2/1
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veals an antipathy to domicil as a jurisdictional prerequisite tc
divorce; and indeed, Mr. Justice Rutledge contended that domici]
is a concept of doubtful origin and should be eliminated.3 6 Nevertheless, even after Williams 11, and until Sherrer v. Sherrer,37 a divorce
granted in a forum where neither party is domiciled is not entitled
to recognition.
38 decided
In Esenwein v. Pennsylvania,
on the same day as
Williams II, identical legal questions were involved, although the
runaway husband had not returned to the state of the marital domicil after the Nevada divorce but instead had set up a home in
Ohio. Mr. Esenwein, therefore, was faced with only the prospect
of having to support the-he thought-ex-Mrs. Esenwein rather than
with incarceration in a Pennsylvania prison. The majority opinion
adopted the conventional ground that there was a conclusive lack
of domicil in Nevada, and that accordingly Pennsylvania was under
no obligation to accept a divorce so rendered. The dissentient justices
of Williams 11, perturbed when the prospects of nullification involved prosecution or illegitimacy, were more amenable when these
involved mere support. Mr. Justice Douglas indicated his doubt as
to the necessity of invalidating the divorce decree for the sole purpose of preserving the support order, because, said he:3 9
"The problem under the full faith and credit clause is to
accommodate as fully as possible the conflicting interests of
the two states ....
The question of marital capacity will often
raise an irreconcilable conflict between the policies of the two.
• . . One must give way in the larger interest of the Federal
Union. But the same conflict is not necessarily present when it
comes to maintenance or support."
This is not the first suggestion within the Court that the mandate
of full faith and credit is not inexorable.4 0 Long prior to Williams I
it had been established that a divorce granted by the forum of the
36

Rutledge, J., dissenting, id. at 259.

37334 U.S. 343 (1948).

38325 U.S. 279 (1945).
391d. at 282. He went on to note the due process aspect: "But I am not convinced that in absence of an appearance or personal service the decree need be
given full faith and credit when it comes to maintenance or support of the other
spouse or the children."
4
OYarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933).
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domicil of both parties is entitled to recognition elsewhere. It was
equally well established that the facts essential to jurisdiction can
be questioned in another state even though contradiction of the
record is involved. 41 A second state may, under appropriate circumstances, inquire into these jurisdictional facts and come to an opposite conclusion. Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Williams II treated a
divorce decree as conclusive of everything ". . . except the jurisdictional facts upon which it is founded ...
"4 Since domicil is a fact of
this type, the duty of the Supreme Court was, not to retry the facts,
but simply to satisfy itself that the ". . . reciprocal duty of respect
owed by the states to one another's adjudications ... has not been
evaded under the guise of finding an absence of domicil and therefore
a want of power in the court rendering the judgment."43
SmMnUa AND COE

Mrs. Sherrer left Massachusetts on April 3, 1944, for what appeared
to be a vacation in Florida; but shortly after her arrival she informed
her husband that she did not intend to return to him. Instead she
soon secured employment and filed in Florida a bill for divorce,
alleging that she had been a local resident for the requisite statutory period." Mr. Sherrer was notified by mail. He retained Florida
counsel, who entered a general appearance and filed an answer
41

Et11ATEMENT, CoNFacr or LAws §111, comment a (1934); GooDracu,
CoNFmIr OF LAws §209 (3d ed. 1949).
42
Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226, 233 (1945).
4
31bid. The problem of review of jurisdictional facts arose also in Rice v. Rice,
336 U.S. 674 (1949), in which the Court concluded that the Connecticut court
had given proper weight to the claim of power of the Nevada court, and that the
burden of proving the lack of Nevada domicil was properly placed on the party
challenging the validity of the decree. The question had been tried according to
appropriate procedure, and the finding was amply supported by the evidence.
The facts were these: Shortly after departing from his domicil in Connecticut,
Mr. Rice had obtained a divorce decree in Nevada without service upon or
participation in the proceedings by the first Mrs. Rice. He immediately married
the second Mrs. Rice but died shortly thereafter without having returned to
Connecticut. In a suit brought by the first Mrs. Rice to determine the property
rights of the parties, the Connecticut courts, after placing upon her the burden of
disproving the bona fides of Mr. Rice's domicil in NPvada in the prior divorce
suit, ultimately declined to give effect to the Nevada decree upon the ground that
at the time of divorce he-was not domiciled there. That judgment was affirmed
on certiorari. Cf. Stumberg, Jurisdiction to Divorce, 24 TEx. L. REv. 119, 132
(1946).
44
F.A. STAT. §65.02 (1949), which prescribes 90 days.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss2/1

12

Divisible Divorce
OF FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW
UNIVERSITY Halsup:
denying the allegations of the complaint. Mr. Sherrer was present
at the hearing but confined his testimony to the issue of custody of
his children; he offered no evidence as regards his wife's alleged
Florida domicil, and failed to appeal from the finding of the court
that it had jurisdiction. The decree was entered on November 29,
whereupon Mrs. Sherrer married one Phelps two days later and
returned to Massachusetts early in February. Later, in Massachusetts, 4 5 Mr. Sherrer obtained relief in a suit predicated on the invalidity of the Florida decree when viewed in the light of the statutory law of Massachusetts. 46 The Massachusetts court considered itself
free to examine the bona fides of Mrs. Sherrer's alleged domicil in
Florida.
The Supreme Court of the United States reversed, 47 however,
on the ground that Mr. Sherrer had participated in the Florida proceedings, thereby bringing himself within the doctrine of Davis v.
Davis. 48 Said the Chief Justice:
45
Sherrer
46

v. Sherrer, 320 Mass. 351, 69 N.E.2d 801 (1946).
MAss, GEN. LAws c. 208, §39 (1932) provides: "A divorce decreed in
another jurisdiction according to the laws thereof by a court having jurisdiction
of the cause and of both the parties shall be valid and effectual in this commonwealth; but if an inhabitant of this commonwealth goes into another jurisdiction
to obtain a divorce for a cause occurring here while the parties resided here, or
for a cause which would not authorize a divorce by the laws of this commonwealth, a divorce so obtained shall be of no force or effect in this commonwealth."
47334 U.S. 343 (1948).
48305 U.S. 32 (1938). Mr. Davis had previously obtained a divorce a mensa
et tharo from Mrs. Davis in the District of Columbia, in which decree he was
ordered to pay support money to Mrs. Davis. He went to Virginia and there
sought to obtain an absolute divorce, asserting Virginia domicil. By special
appearance Mrs. Davis denied his claim of Virginia domicil, but the court
decided this issue against her. Instead of appealing, she withdrew from the case
and made no defense on the merits. When the husband sought in the District
of Columbia to have the decree for alimony set aside on the basis of the absolute
Virginia divorce, Mrs. Davis alleged that it had been rendered without jurisdiction. On review the Supreme Court rejected her contention, inasmuch as both
parties had tried in Virginia the issue of domicil and were concluded by the
result.
The doctrine of res judicata applied in the Sherrer case is not unknown to
Florida law. In Gordon v. Gordon, 160 Fla. 838, 36 So.2d 774 (1948), the wife
had previously instituted a suit for divorce against her husband in Pennsylvania,
wherein he appeared. Before its termination she moved to Florida, instituted a
similar suit, and petitioned the Pennsylvania court for leave to dismiss her suit
there. This petition was denied, and a final decree was entered prior to determination of the Florida proceedings. She did not appeal. Her husband, who had
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"We believe that the decision of this court in the Davis case
and those in related situations are clearly indicative of the result to be reached here. Those cases stand for the proposition
that the requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant
from collaterally attacking a divorce on jurisdictional grounds
in the courts of a sister state where there has been participation
by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where the defendant has been afforded full opportunity to contest the jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to such
collateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered the
decree."4 9
The Court distinguished in personam from ex parte divorce decrees.
Re-examination of the findings of jurisdictional facts is permissible
in the latter instance but not in the former. The Chief Justice further observed, however-and this may be highly significant-that
the Florida proceedings were conducted ". . . in a manner consistent
with the highest requirements of due process...."50
The facts of Coe v. Coe,51 the judicially denominated 52 "companion" to the Sherrer case, are similar. The parties were also
domiciled in Massachusetts, where the wife had obtained a separation decree and support order. The husband departed for Nevada, remained for the statutory six-week period, and instituted suit
for divorce. The wife appeared, admitted the husband's allegations
of residence, and obtained a divorce on cross-petition. She then
returned to Massachusetts and started proceedings to have the husband, who meanwhile had returned with his Nevada-acquired wife,
adjudged in contempt for failure to continue payments under the
separation order. Against his defense that the Nevada decree overrode the separation order, she offered evidence to establish invalidity of the divorce decree for lack of domicil. On certiorari the
Supreme Court forbade collateral attack by a party to the decree.
Since Sherrer and Coe, recognition of foreign divorce proceedings
meanwhile appeared in the Florida suit, introduced the Pennsylvania decree in
bar. The doctrine of full faith and credit, coupled with that of factually identical
causes of action, was applied in the sustaining of his motion to dismiss. See
2 U. OF FLA. L. 1REv. 136 (1949).
49
Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351 (1948).
5Od. at 356.
51334 U.S. 378 (1948).
52Id.

at 379.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol3/iss2/1

14

Halsup: Divisible Divorce
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW
is clarified in one aspect at least; if the respondent sees fit to contest
the suit in any manner, or if he has an opportunity to litigate the
question of jurisdiction, then he has no recourse other than direct
appeal. Should he have the good judgment to stay out of the foreign
proceedings, however, he preserves the right to attack them collaterally by testing the basic jurisdictional facts. These two cases
draw a sharp line between the personam jurisdiction and the ex
parte situation of the Williams cases.
The theory on which Sherrer is based is said to be res judicata;
as the court had previously said of Mrs. Davis:r 3
"She may not say that he was not entitled to sue for divorce
in the state court, for she appeared there and by plea put in
issue his allegations as to domicil, introduced evidence to show
it false, took exceptions to the commissioner's report, and sought
to have the court sustain them and uphold her plea."
The seeming extension of the "actual litigation" rule in the Sherrer
and Coe cases is more apparent than real, however; although res
judicata is under the command of full faith and credit, the test
formulated is limited. As Mr. Chief Justice Vinson phrased it:"
"... the requirements of full faith and credit bar a defendant
from collaterally attacking a divorce decree on jurisdictional
grounds in the courts of a sister State where there has been
participation by the defendant in the divorce proceedings, where
the defendant has been accorded full opportunity to contest the
jurisdictional issues, and where the decree is not susceptible to
such collateral attack in the courts of the State which rendered
the decree."
Furthermore, question may well be raised as to whether Sherrer
and Coe are an application of res judicata at all. Some may consider them merely a variant of the estoppel rule. The writer would
not object too violently if the Court had taken this view. Logically,
a review of the concepts of jurisdiction and domicil leads to the
conclusion that a divorce decree rendered by a court of a state in
53Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938).
54

Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 351 (1948).
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which neither party is domiciled should have no effect upon the
existence of the marital status; but such is not the law. The judiciary
has instead built up a doctrine, analogous to estoppel, under which
a party invoking jurisdiction cannot thereafter deny it. In such situations the courts rarely declare the decree good; they merely refuse
to allow the same individual to litigate the issue again when he has
appeared once. These decrees do not bar the sovereign from prosecuting for bigamy; neither do they legitimize children. Furthermore,
children of the first marriage are not barred from claiming their
rights. But the former spouse cannot regain status merely by relying
on invalidity of the decree. 55
EsTN AND KEIGER

Decisions that may well have been anticipated, but that have
nevertheless inspired a generous amount of comment, are Estin v.
Estin,56 and Kreiger v. Kreiger.57 Mrs. Estin had obtained a separation decree and alimony in a contested action in a New York Court.
Thereafter Mr. Estin went to Nevada and obtained ex parte a divorce
without provision for alimony, whereupon Mrs. Estin brought suit
in New York for arrears in alimony. He appeared and relied on the
55

See, e.g., REsTATEmENT, CoNrcr or LAws §112 (1934); GOODBICH, CoN401 (3d ed. 1949); Harper, The Myth of the Void Divorce, 2
LAw & CoNTEux. PnoB. 335 (1935); Harper, The Validity of Void Divorces, 79
U. oF PA. L. REv. 158 (1930). Query: Could this not have served Vinson, C.J.,
better than the dilution of the res judicata theory in the Coe case?
50334 U.S. 541 (1948). See Carey and MacChesney, Divorces by Consent of
the Parties and Divisible Divorce Decrees, 43 ILL. L. REV. 608 (1948); Paulsen,
Migratory Divorce: Chaps. III and IV, 24 IND. L. REv. 24 (1948); Reese and
Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COL. L. REv. 153
(1949); Note, 22 So. CALr. L. REv. 155 (1949); 48 COL. L. REv. 1083 (1948);
34 Cons. L.Q. 263 (1948).
57334 U.S. 555 (1947). Mrs. Kreiger sought judgment for back alimony in
the New York courts by virtue of a prior New York separation decree. Mr.
Kxeiger tried unsuccessfully to plead in bar a Nevada decree of divorce obtained
by him with only constructive notice on Mrs. Kreiger. While the Nevada divorce
was pending, Mrs. Kreiger had obtained a New York injunction purporting to
restrain her husband from seeking a divorce elsewhere. Whether the Nevada
court denied full faith and credit to this injunction, of which it had knowledge,
was not decided by the Supreme Court; but it did hold, citing Estin v. Estin,
that Nevada had no power to adjudicate Mrs. Kreiger's rights in the New York
judgment. Cf. Dandina v. Dandina, 86 Cal. App. 505, 195 P.2d 871 (1949), 22
So. CAIJ-. L. REv. 314 (1949).
ICT oFr LAWS
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Nevada decree; she challenged the Nevada domicil. The New
York court found that he was domiciled in Nevada at the time of
his divorce there; but it held that, by virtue of its personal jurisdiction over him when it had rendered the earlier support decree,
the ex parte Nevada proceedings could not nullify that decree. To
his contention on review that New York law could not compel a
man to support his ex-wife, the Supreme Court of the United States,
speaking through Mr. Justice Douglas, had a short answer: 58
"The difficulty with that argument is that the highest court in
New York has held in this case that a support order can survive
divorce .... That conclusion is binding on us .... "
Thus Mr. Justice Douglas adverted to his Esenwein position that
the problem under full faith and credit is one of balancing conflcting
state interests; while the divorcing forum has little concern with the
welfare of the foreign spouse, her home state may properly object
to the possible liability of being called upon later to support her.
The marriage status is but one of many incidents; and the full faith
and credit clause does not require that a divorcing court conclude
all of them at once. "Divisible" divorce came into being, and effected
a splitting of foreign divorce decrees into two separate and distinct
components: that of status or capacity to remarry, and that of rights
comparable to those of property. The first demands recognition as
long as the petitioner was domiciled in the divorcing forum at the
time of divorce; but an ex parte decree may be refused recognition
in spite of domicil in so far as it purports to affect the second. The
doctrine of Estin results in a ". . . divorce good to end a marriage but
invalid to affect dependent property rights."5 9
In the Estin case the Court was confronted with a problem similar to that of Haddock. It is conceded that there was jurisdiction in
the Nevada Court in the sense that Estin was actually domiciled
there. Was the Court, after the holding in the Sherrer case, to apply
full faith and credit, as the Williams case would seem to demand, or
was there the problem of due process? The opinion advances two
distinct grounds for the decision: 60
58

Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 544 (1948).

See Note, 1 A.L.R.2d 1423

(1948).
59

Jackson, J., dissenting in Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 679 (1949).
6OEstin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 545 (1948); cf. Carey and MacChesney, supra
note 56, at 615-619.
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"The full faith and credit clause is not to be applied, accordionlike, to accommodate our personal predilections. It substituted
a command for the earlier principles of comity and thus basically altered the status of the States as independent sovereigns."
This is the basis of Williams L Although the full faith and credit
clause is not inexorable, the exceptions are few.
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the state of domicil of one
spouse may on constructive service enter a decree that changes all of
the legal incidents of a marriage relation. "The fact that the requirements of fill faith and credit... are exacting, if not inexorable...,
does not mean, however, that the state of the domicil of one spouse
may, through the use of constructive service, enter a decree that
changes every legal incidence of the marriage relationship." 61 From the
standpoint of full faith and credit, Mrs. Estin had been served by publication only. She had made no appearance in Nevada. It is conceded
that the minimum requirements of due process were met in the sense
in which those requirements are now interpreted by the Supreme
Court: her husband's Nevada domicil was sufficient to uphold a
decree changing the marital capacity of both parties in Nevada, as
well as elsewhere. New York had an interest none the less-and a
legitimate one-in the problem of support of the ex-wife. Therefore
full faith and credit might, it seems, have some exceptional leeway,
as suggested by Mr. Justice Stone in his dissent in Yarborough v.
62
Yarborough.
Quite apart from full faith and credit, however, there is another
question involved, namely, whether Nevada could, in the absence of
personal service or personal appearance, readjudicate "property" rights
of Mrs. Estin established by the prior New York decree. When confronted with the family squabbles of the Estins and the conflicting interests of New York and Nevada, the Court accepted the theory that
the right to continued support arises from the prior judgment itself
rather than from the marital status. An attempt, in overriding the
support decree, to exercise in persnam jurisdiction over a person
not before the court is not sanctioned. Therefore New York need
not later accord full faith and credit to this portion of the Nevada
decree. This is the language of due process of law, at least in the
respect that proper service is a basic step therein. In reality the
OlEstin v. Estin, 384 U.S. 541, 546 (1948).
62290 U.S. 202, 213 (1933).
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Estin case, despite the turmoil that it has provoked, presents little
that is new. The Court merely returned to another venerable landmark, the Barber case 63 of nearly a century ago. And inferentially,
from the citation of cases on which the majority relied, property
rights not subjected to the jurisdiction of the divorcing court in a
64
migratory situation remain unaffected.
Earlier, in Williams I, the Court was reluctant to establish exceptions to the operation of the full faith and credit clause in dealing
with judgments rendered by the courts of a sister state, but it took
pains to point out that prior decisions: 65
".... refuse to require courts of one state to allow acts or judgments of another to control the disposition or devolution of
realty in the former. They seem to rest on the doctrine that the
state where the land is located is 'sole mistress' of its rules of
real property."
It is submitted that the Estin case was correctly decided; the
Court merely returned to basic jurisdictional principles and distinctions. 66 In so far as jurisdiction was present, full faith and credit
demanded enforcement of the Nevada decree; in so far as jurisdiction
over property rights not before the divorcing court was lacking,
due process forbade any other state to enforce the purported decree.
Perhaps it might be said that we are back again to the days of
Haddock, which has exhibited a vitality equal to that of the proverbial cat. Williams I was said to have buried him. But in the postEstin era it is not the ghost of Haddock but Haddock himself,
6321 How. 582 (U.S. 1859). A subsequent decree of divorce by H in Wisconsin without appearance of W was held powerless to cut off a prior separation
order for alimony secured by W, with H appearing, in New York, where both
parties had resided at that time. W obtained enforcement of that order in the
federal district court in Wisconsin, after service upon H, and the Supreme Court
affirmed. Evidently the district court could not see why H should be relieved
of his New York obligation merely by relitigating the issue in the guise of divorce
in a distant jurisdiction out of contact with W. Cf. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S.
714 (1877).
64
Douglas, J., in Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 548 (1948), said: "Jurisdiction
over an intangible can indeed only arise from control or power over the persons
whose
relationships are the source of the rights and obligations."
65
Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 294 n.5 (1942). See RESTATEMENr, CONFLICT OF LAWs §248 (1934).
66
For these see RESTATEMENT, JUDGMENTs §74 (1942).
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stripped of his drab cloak of matrimonial fault and now attired in
the more serviceable and colorful garb of jurisdiction and due
process, who has reappeared in all his vigor despite the protests of
Professor Beale and Mr. Justice Jackson that a divorce decree must
of necessity be all good or all bad.
It has long been customary to speak of divorce as a proceeding
in rem, and much of the confusion in this field of law can be traced
primarily to the early policy of so treating divorce. Yet the Supreme
Court has often denied that this jurisdiction is entirely in rem, and
indeed has not infrequently emphasized the fact that it includes
elements of the in6 7 personam decree. Mr. Justice Douglas, for example, has stated:
"The historical view that a proceeding for a divorce was a
proceeding in rem was rejected by the Haddock case. We likewise agree that it does not aid in the solution of the problem
presented by this case to label these proceedings as proceedings in rem. Such a suit, however, is not a mere in personam
action."
The difficulty with the in rem concept is, of course, that the socalled res, not being tangible, is not only not fixed permanently in
one jurisdiction, as is land, but is not even susceptible of temporary
location without resort to at least one person-and persons become
more mobile every day as transportation facilities improve. Yet,
from the in personam standpoint, must the intangible "marriage
status" follow both spouses, with the result that movement of one
alone is ineffectual to transfer it; or, if it can follow one of them,
to which one is it attached? Does this choice, in turn, rest on sex,
or on fault of the other spouse, or on mere priority in obtaining a
divorce first somewhere? Again, by virtue of the interest of the
community in the family as an institution and more specifically in
the support of minor children and other individuals directly or even
indirectly affected, to what extent are mere contract concepts applicable, including remedies for breach?
Subsequent to the Estin case, there is no utility in attempting
to classify a decree of divorce as in rem, in personam, or quasi in
rem-whatever this last phrase may mean. The fact is that a divorce
67

Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 297 (1942).
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decree is a divorce decree, and nothing more. In order to revive
the "all good or all bad" decree, the presence of the defendant as
well as of the petitioner is essential. Failing appearance of both, a
decree breaks into its component parts; the division is predicated
verbally on the existence or non-existence of a proper basis of jurisdiction; and the propriety of the assumed basis of jurisdiction rests
in turn on broad decisions of policy.
Perhaps, indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized the widespread popular view that nothing is to be gained by forcing people
to live together unwillingly as man and wife, and that the decree
of a state that recognizes this fact must be respected as regards
legal termination of this factually regrettable status. The constitutional brake applied, outside the divorcing forum, is full faith
and credit. Perhaps it has also recognized that the termination of
an undesirable status does not warrant overthrowing the equally
widespread popular view that the community of the divorced spouse
should not, by the mere action of a foreign forum, be saddled with
the necessity of caring for such spouse and, in many cases, for the
children too. Earlier liability to family and community is not pegged
to future status as man and wife. The constitutional brake applied,
this time to the divorcing forum, is due process, in its basic jurisdictional aspect.
SUGGESTED REMEDIES

In addition to Mr. Justice Rutledge's insistence on the abandonment of domicil as a basis for divorce jurisdiction, 68 the unending
search for uniformity in the recognition of ex parte divorce decrees
has resulted in a variety of extra-judicial proposals. These range from
passage of uniform state recognition statutes and a uniform divorce
law to additional implementation of the full faith and credit clause,
to a constitutional amendment to place domestic relations regulations
68Rutledge, J., dissenting in Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226. 244
(1945): "Once again the ghost of 'unitary domicil' returns on its perpetual round,
in the guise of 'jurisdictional fact,' to upset judgments, marriages, divorces, undermine the relations founded upon them, and make this Court the unwilling and
uncertain arbiter between the concededly valid laws and decrees of sister states.
From Bell and Andrews to Davis to Haddock to Williams and now back to
Haddock and Davis through Williams again - is the maze the Court has travelled
in a domiciliary wilderness, only to come out with no settled constitutional policy
where one is needed most."
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within the power of the Federal Government, followed by a federal
divorce statute. All of the proposals are obviously aimed at uniformity in divorce recognition; and most of them point toward the
achievement of some certainty, in lieu of the present unpredictability,
of the marriage relationship in all its varied aspects.
Uniform State Statutes
The Uniform Divorce Recognition Act has met with the approval
of the Commissioners of Uniform Laws and has gained the endorsement of the House of Delegates of the American Bar Association.
The essential provisions of this measure would deny effect to extrastate divorce whenever the party securing it either has been domiciled in the divorcing forum within twelve months prior to obtaining it and has returned to his old domicil within eighteen months
thereafter, or has retained residence in the divorcing forum while
physically absent within the period during which he was laying
a basis for divorce jurisdiction.
Prospects of adoption of the Uniform Act by any substantial
number of states appear slight. Nor is there much hope in appointing
a commission to look into the matter. 9 The proposal of a specified
residence period in lieu of the present all-too-fluid concept of domicil adds but little to the solution of the problem. The difficulty is
that the states thriving heartily on divorce traffic are quite separate
from those desiring to maintain their antipathy to divorce. It should
be added that this article does not attempt to discuss the question
of whether the former are mercenary or enlightened, and whether
the latter are archaic or highly moral. The important fact is that
violent disagreement on policies exists.
Constitutional Amendment
The first attempt to amend the Constitution so as to vest authority
over marriage and divorce in Congress was made in 1884; and since
that time some seventy or more amendments have been proposed
without receiving even favorable Congressional action. Adoption
appears improbable in a field of law in which determination of
policy by each state is in the ascendancy. Furthermore, the long
6gDL&.N, Conflict of Laws in 1948 ANNuAL StrvEr oF AMxmucAN LAW 47-48
(1949); cf. Note, 2 A.L.R.2d 292 (1948).
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history of the attempt to enact a statute conferring jurisdiction on
the Federal Government, and to implement effectively by statute
the full faith and credit clause, does not predict early success. 70

Forum non Conveniens
Much progress could be made toward predictability of marital
status if state courts, when requested to adjudicate family squabbles
imported by either spouse from a distant jurisdiction, would apply
the traditional forum non conveniens doctrine. The foreign divorcing
forum normally has little legitimate concern with the substantive
law to be administered, and should look to the law of the jurisdiction
that does have substantial contacts. It is obvious that atttempts to
balance conflicting interests of different states under the full faith
and credit clause have been unsuccessful; and the easy answer of
letting the divorcing forum resolve conflicts by applying its own rule
has led to migratory divorce in an unnecessarily large number of
cases.
The Supreme Court, unfortunately, has indicated a consistent trend
toward complete freedom of each state either to assume jurisdiction
or to decline it. Few courts have had the hardihood, to borrow Mr.
Justice Jackson's phrase, 7 1 ". . . to refer . . . to the doctrine of forum
non conveniens by name." Some have consistently followed the theory
that a court has inherent discretion to accept any cause within its
jurisdiction, even though the matter might be more appropriately
litigated elsewhere. The forum non conveniens doctrine has not been
readily accepted; and its development has been retarded by the
notion that the privileges and immunities clause7 2 assures the American citizen a right to sue on any matter in any forum. This idea is
no longer tenable, inasmuch as the Supreme Court in recent years
7

0
See Frankfurter, J., concurring in Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,
304 (1942). Various proposals are outlined in Note, 17 GEo. WAsH. L. REv. 380
(1949). See also Franklin, The Dilemma of Migratory Divorce: A Partial Solution
Through Federal Legislation, 1 OKI A. L. REV. 151 (1948); Merrill, The Utility
of Divorce Recognition Statutes in Dealingwith the Problem of Migratory Divorce,
27 TF_x. L. REv. 291 (1949); Radin, A Suggested Solution of the Interstate
Divorce Problem, 69 N.J.L.J. 25 (1946); Rothenburg, Divorce Reform, the

Question of Extra-territorialRecognition and Proposals for Reform, 7 LAw. Gunm
REv. 218 (1947); Stumberg, Jurisdictionto Divorce, 24 TEX. L. REv. 119 (1946).
71Jackson, Full Faith and Credit -The Lawyer's Clause of the Constitution,
45 COL.
L. REv. 1, 30 (1945).
72 U. S. CONsT. Amend. XIV, §1.
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has expressly said that a state court in appropriate circumstances
may apply the non conveniens doctrine.73 It has been expressly
codified in so far as the federal courts are concerned; and there
is ample state precedent. 74 As Morse puts it:75
"... a division must be made between those actions in which
the forum state has substantial contacts with the case at bar and
those in which it has no association other than that it is the
forum ....
In the latter, the courts ought to avoid insoluble
conflicts by resort to the rule of forum non convenien&"
Choice of Law
American conflict of laws deals with the basic problem of our
federal system. Amidst the discordant and irreconcilable decisions
of the various state courts and legislatures, the full faith and credit
clause and the due process clause, of the Constitution of the United
States must serve to effect the determination of disputes having
substantial contacts with more than one state. The Supreme Court,
as the final arbiter in applying these two general provisions, must
as matters now stand build the framework of the conflict of laws
for the entire country. Considerations of justice as well as of mere
expediency should be called into play in adopting specific conflicts
rules, particularly as to choice of laws.
One may well doubt the validity of a finding of domicil by the
existing rules and methods in those cases in which one spouse goes
to a "hospitable dispenser of disunion," to borrow Professor Powell's
phrase, ( and returns to his former domicil immediately with a
newly-acquired spouse, as did Mrs. Phelps (Sherrer), Mrs. Williams
(Hendrix), and Coe with Dawn Allen. It is bordering on the ridicu7

aWilliams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 295 n.5 (1942); Broderick v.
Rosner, 294 U.S. 629, 648 (1935); see Fraser, Actions in Rem, 34 Comnmm L.Q.
29, 49 (1948); Jackson, Full Faith and Credit-The Lawyer's Clause of the
Constitution, 45 COL. L. REV. 1, 30-31 (1945).
74
Perhaps this furnishes a short answer to Judge Alexander's embarrassment.
See Alexander, The Follies of Divorce, 36 A.B.A.J. 105 (1950); Alexander,
Family Life Conference, 32 J. Am.. JuD. Soe'y 88 (1948).
75Morse, Characterization:Shadow or Substance, 49 CoL L. REv. 1027, 1055

(1949).
7

6Powell, And Repent at Leisure, 58 HAv. L. Rnv. 930, 956 (1945).
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lous to argue that any substantial contact with the divorcing forum
exists in such cases. When the parties have become domiciled in
two different states, the law of the common marital domicil makes
a strong claim to recognition as the only proper law. The American
application of the lex fori to divorce suits involving primarily foreign
elements is unique, to say the least. 77 Admittedly, when both parties
are domiciled in the forum, or when an appearance is entered by
the respondent, the doctrine should not be strongely condemned.
But the validity and reasonableness of applying the lex fori as the
governing substantive law in- all instances has been little explored
and seldom questioned, despite both the lack of any clear conceptual
basis for the doctrine and the resultant confusion with which the
field of extra-territorial divorce recognition is replete. 78 Either the
misconduct offered as a basis for divorce should occur while the
parties are domiciled in the divorcing forum, or it should constitute
a ground recognized by the law of the common marital domicil
when it takes place elsewhere; but only a few courts have been
willing to adopt this view.79
The assumption that the forum must be free to apply grounds for
divorce consistent with or derived from its own law is by no means
necessary.80 Recognition of jurisdiction based either on personal
service or on appearance in any civilized jurisdiction, coupled with
an appropriate choice of law, would obviate one flaw in the current
practice, in which as a matter of actual fact there is rarely any
8
real opportunity to defend. '
Section 8 of the Restatement advances the proposition that the
validity of divorce should be treated exactly as are interests in
land. The law determining such interests is that of the situs, which
in fact retains controlling power. Not so with the incidents of status.
Nevertheless, there is serious doubt that the Estin case does more
than apply the law of the controlling jurisdiction; the law of the
last common or matrimonial domicil makes a persuasive claim for
acceptance as the "proper law." Since no statutory means have ever
77
78

RABEL, CONFLICT OF LAWS

416-426 (1945).

CONFLICT OF LAWS §135, comment a (1934), is not illuminating. We are told that the law of the forum governs, not because it is the place
where the action is brought but because it is the domicil of one of the parties.
79
Cf., e.g., GooDIcH, CONFLICT OF LAWS 404 (3d ed. 1949).
80
CooK, LOGICAL AND LEGAL BASES, CONFLICT OF LAWS 436 (1942).
81
See Corwin, Out Haddocking Haddock, 93 U. OF PA. L. REv. 341 (1945);
Stumberg, Jurisdiction to Divorce, 24 TEx. L. REv. 119, 133 (1946).
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been placed at the disposal of the Supreme Court to reconcile the
divergent divorce policies of the several states, there is merit to
2
Husserl's conclusion: 8

"There can be no valid solution of the divorce dilemma ...so
long as the divorce forum which can claim only a casual interest
in the marriage relation insists on applying its domestic divorce
law, in total disregard of the divorce policies of the state whose
interest in the particular marriage is far superior to that of the
forum."
The Supreme Court has thus far failed to face squarely the needfor uniformity in the problem of choice of law, yet the only acceptable alternatives are: (1) to leave this choice to the local policies
of the states, with the regrettable result, now apparent, that "* . . 'the
most learned lawyer cannot advise them [his clients] with any
confidence,"83 or (2) to recognize candidly that choice of law constitutes a pressing problem under both the full faith and credit
and the due process clauses of the Constitution, and that the Court
has a duty to mark the limits of variation, just as it has admittedly
narrowed the scope of public policy in refusals by one state to
enforce judgments of sister states.8 4
The difficulties created by a migratory spouse in a domicil. acquired solely for divorce purposes are but another example of a
factual situation significantly connected with states having different
internal laws. Haphazard pursuit of uniformity has erroneously led
to the policy of selection of one to the exclusion of the other. Few
will seriously contend that in a controversy between two parties
one of them should be able to gain a decisive advantage merely by
bringing his suit in a distant forum. Yet the choice of law rule adopted
by the forum is usually conclusive;8 5 and at present the courts of
the various states are not cooperating in so applying choice of law
principles that a given dispute is settled on the same substantive
82
Husserl, Some Reflections on Williams v. North CarolinaII, 32 VA. L. REv.
980, 989 (1946).
83jackson, J., dissenting in Estin v. Estin, 384 U.S. 541, 553 (1948).
84
Jackson, Full Faith and Credit- The Lawyers Clause of the Constitution,
45 COL. L. REv. 1, 26 (1945).
85
Even renvoi, normally frowned upon by American courts, has been suggested;
see Griswold, Renvoi Revisited, 51 Harv. L. Rgv. 1165, 1202-1204 (1938).
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law basis in every jurisdiction.86 Uniformity and predictability are
not, of course, the ony objectives of conflict of laws, but they do
remain the principal ones.
The full faith and credit clause as applied by the Court to date
has obviously failed to achieve uniformity in the area of divorce
recognition; and there is serious doubt as to whether it could ever
87
completely solve the many problems involved, at least if used alone.
Due Process
The principle has been generally accepted that a judgment or
decree rendered without jurisdiction is void in the state of the forum,
and hence is clearly not entitled to recognition elsewhere under
the language of the Implementing Statute.8 8 There is another basic
principle in American jurisprudence, based as it is on the dual
sovereignty of our federal system, that before a state can assume
jurisdiction in actions involving persons or property there must be
some physical connection within the forum. This is essential to both
the full faith and credit and the due process clauses. In accordance
with this principle, a judgment against property located in another
state at the time of the proceedings is invalid if personal jurisdiction
is lacking. Similarly, a judgment purporting to bind property to be
brought into the state in the future is invalid unless based on
personal jurisdiction. The binding effect of such judgments is limited
to property located in the forum at the time the proceedings are
instituted. Any lesser connection renders the judgment a nullity.8 9
The endless dissensions revolving around jurisdiction for divorce
86

Any suggestion leading to a different choice of law rule must, of course, be
addressed to the legislatures as well as to the courts; cf., e.g., Chisholm v. Chisholm, 98 Fla. 1196, 125 So. 694 (1929) (courts have jurisdiction to divorce on

statutory
grounds).
87

See, e.g., Freund, Chief Justice Stone in the Conflict of Laws, 59 IAuv.
L. REv. 1210, 1235 (1946): "The upshot is, or is meant to be, that problems of

choice of law have not lent themselves to satisfactory solution as conslitutional
questions, and that in their nature they cannot lhe expected to"; Reese and Johnson, supra note 56, at 175: "In short, it is believed that the mandate of full faith

and credit to judgments should be limited to their effect as res judicata and not
extended
so as to include questions of choice of law that may thereafter arise."
88
REv. STAT. §905 (1875), 28 U.S.C. §687 (1946); cf. REsTATEmENT, JuDcMENTs §4, comment b (1942).
8

9See Note, The Requirements of Seizure in the Exercise of Quasi and In Rem
REv. 657, 670 (1950).

Jurisdiction, 63 H.nv. L.
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purposes on the basis of characterization of the proceedings as in
rem, inpersonarn, or quasi in rem need no further elaboration here.
The best that can be hoped for is the early disappearance of these
characterizations from the cases and comments in so far as divorce
recognition problems are concerned. But the mere fact that a suit
for divorce is in many respects unique does not rule out the concept
of due process requirements. What has been termed elementary
justice demands that an absent defendant be given in fact a real
chance to defend; mere notice of the pendency of a suit, under
circumstances such as those in the Rice case,90 -dbes not suffice.
Admittedly, substituted service serves a useful purpose when the
defendant tries deliberately to avoid an appropriate forum. In the
typical migratory divorce case, however, in which a severe hardship
is imposed on the defendant by calling him across a continent and
away from the place in which he has his established connections,
a requirement that traveling expense be furnished, along with reasonable counsel fees, living expense during absence from home, and
the cost of procuring necessary witnesses from distant points, would
serve a useful purpose. Indeed, due process should demand no less.
In general there is scant reason for not compelling the petitioner to
seek out the respondent in a divorce case, just as he usually must
in a transitory action. 9 '
This possibility has not been ignored by the members of the
Supreme-Court. It has the advantage that it may be fashioned out
of the means at hand. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in Williams I,
stated: "I cannot but think that in its preoccupation with the full
faith and credit clause the court has slighted the due process
clause."9 2 To him, at least, there is an inconsistency within our legal
system when one who has these continuing rights springing from
the marriage relation should be deprived of them without a hearing.
To him Haddock spells power, and power spells jurisdiction. The
Chief Justice takes pains to point out in the Sherrer case 93 that the
Florida divorce proceedings met the requirements of procedural due
process. In the Estin case Mr. Justice Douglas speaks in terms of
90Rice
91

v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674 (1949).

See Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause, 39 ILm. L. RBv.
1, 32-35 (1944); Radin, A Suggested Solution of the Interstate Divorce Problem,

69 NJ.L.J. 233,(1946).
92Wilamsj v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 320 (1942).
93
Sberrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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power, of jurisdiction: 94
"But the question is whether Nevada could under any circumstances adjudicate rights of respondent under the New York
judgment when she was not personally served or did not appear
in the proceeding."
Nevada could not. Since Nevada had no power to adjudicate the
rights of the respondent, full faith and credit did not have to be
accorded that part of the Nevada decree. Mr. Justice Jackson, dissenting in the Rice case, points to the vice and fallacy of Williams II
as the fact: 95
".. . that one of the parties may leave the state where both
have for years made their home, seek a forum of his choice,
and pretty much on his own terms alter the pattern of two
lives without affording the other even a decent chance to be
heard. . . . Lillian either had to leave her teaching and means
of support to follow her husband two thousand miles from any
place where she ever had lived, or let her marriage go by
default."
Her chance of successfully defending in Nevada would apparently
have been slight. He adds caustically, "But this court had called
this due process of law for Lillian."9 6 He deplores magnifying the
difficulties in an already confused situation by ".... repudiating the
usual requirements of procedural due process"; 97 he would have
affirmed the decision below because he believed that ".... this divorce
was always and in all places invalid on due process grounds for
want of jurisdiction of the defendant."98 It is possible that otherseven members of the Supreme Court - will come to share his views.
If so, they will but be adopting the local law as expressed by the
highest courts of the states in which are born the majority of the
divorces of doubtful parentage. 99
94

Estin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541, 547 (1948).
Rice v. Rice, 336 U.S. 674, 678 (1949).
96Ibid.
95

971d. at 680.

98Ibid.
99

1 U.

See Note, Divorce: Vacation and Modification of Final Decrees in Florida,
OF FLA. L. REv. 376 (1948).
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Bona fide domicil may jiudicially be made a requirement for due
process in a divorce suit. Only federal judicial action can supply a
solution to the problems of Mrs. Rice and Mrs. Estin; and, aside
from some such compromise as casting on a party relying on a foreign
divorce decree the burden of establishing the jurisdictional facts
requisite to its validity, only the due process clause is now available
in view of the unsatisfactory results wrought by reliance on the
full faith and credit clause.' 00 The Court could require, as a prerequisite to subsequent invocation of the full faith and credit clause,
that the petitioner must bring his divorce suit in the jurisdiction in
which the respondent resides. Or, in order to avoid the vice of ex
parte migratory divorces, namely, that the respondent is deprived
of a fair opportunity to be heard by being required to submit the
marital status to a court of petitioner's own choosing, regardless of
costs or of distance from the home, it could impose the requirements
of due process despite the avidity of the divorcing forum for tourist
divorce trade. A fair hearing is implicit in the concept of procedural
due process.
There is obvious merit in Corwin's suggestion'' that the due
process clause be enforced in all divorce cases in the sense of
Pennoyer v. Neff,10 2 that is, that personal service on the respondent
be required in all personal actions. He treats divorce as in personam.
There is an irony in posting on the courthouse door, or in publishing
in a predominantly local newspaper, a command that the wife, a
resident of Portugal, return to Florida to defend a divorce suit.
Does this meet the due process requirements that the Supreme Court
of Florida laid down in Ogden v. Ogden?03 If due process in divorce
proceedings, as in other fields of law, requires that process most
likely to give actual information and notice, divorce decrees based
on publication are logically void.
It may be emphasized that Mr. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion
in Esenwein'0 and his majority opinion in Estin,0 5 although written
lo0Cf. Harper, The Supreme Court and the Conflict of Laws, 47 CoL. L. REv.
883, 909 (1947): "It may be that it were better if the Court got out of the family
law business altogether and let the states stew in each other's juices which, in
effect,1 is about what it is so painfully doing anyway."
10 Corwin, Out Haddocking Haddock, 93 U. or PA. L. REv. 841 (1945).
10295 U.S. 714 (1877).
oOgden v. Ogden, 159 Fla. 604, 83 So.2d 870 (1947).
10 4Esenwein v. Pennsylvania, 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
lOSEstin v. Estin, 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
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largely in terms of the interest of the second state, nevertheless
emphasize the jurisdictional features to a considerable extent, and
may accordingly be some indication that he too would elect, in a
proper case, to decide problems of this type squarely on the ground
of lack of due process; ". . . there, it is believed, is clearly where they
belong." 0 6 This seems preferable to the conflicting theories advanced
from time to time to justify the application of full faith and credit.
Estin, for example, merely seeks to accommodate the interests of
both Nevada and New York in a broken marriage by restricting
each state to those matters in which her concern is dominant from
the standpoint of power.
Application of the due process concept would, of course, have
the salutary effect of nullifying the decree everywhere. Furthermore,
while under full faith and credit there lurks the problem of whether
domicil as adjudged by the divorcing forum will meet the tests
of domicil in the federal courts, this would become far less important if due process were applied.
Should the Supreme Court deem a change in emphasis warranted,
a handy precedent is available in the Griffin case, 10 7 in which Mr.
Chief Justice Stone, writing for the Court, said:
"A judgment procured in violation of procedural due process
Moreover, due process
is not entitled to full faith and credit ....
requires that no other jurisdiction shall give effect, even as a
matter of comity, to a judgment elsewhere acquired without
due process."
Davis v. Davis'08 slumbered unobserved for years until called upon
to dictate the Sherrer'0 9 decision and its unfortunate implications.
The Griffin case has been dormant for only four years, and is available to strip migratory divorces of much of their present attractiveness
to the petitioner and his attorney. Its application would at least
achieve a bit of certainty and a measure of fair play for some of
the litigants.

' 0 6Reese and Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to judgments, 49

COL. 7L. Rzv. 153, 167 (1949).
10 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220, 228 (1940).
108305 U.S. 32 (1938).
109Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
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175

CONCLUSION

The criticisms of Sherrer and Estin are numerous. The former
may be characterized as a policy decision looking to uniformity.
The latter may be distinguished from Haddock because of the preexisting support decree. One objection has been minimized somewhat, however. Lawyers will know-for a time at least-how to advise
their clients, even though a resort to explanation on jurisdictional
grounds is essential and many clients will not appreciate the sad
news. If both parties appear, the divorce will be clearly binding as
to status. If only one appears, the foreign decree is subject to attack on jurisdictional grounds. Even if this attack fails as to status,
rights in property remain for separate consideration; and, at least
when these have been legally adjudicated in another forum prior
to the divorce decree, it can still be held ineffective as to them.
Perhaps lawyers should so advise their clients.
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